ATTN: Defending Japan joins Japan Security Watch

Defending Japan started a month ago after months of wanting to get back into writing, and with the prodding of a few people over at Twitter. One of those people was Kyle Mizokami of Japan Security Watch. He helped convince me to start the blog, helped me gain some traffic, and now he’s offered me a chance to join forces. How could I refuse?

From this point on,  Defending Japan will be absorbed into Japan Security Watch and you will be able to find all the previous and future posts at that site. I want to thank everyone who plugged this blog and linked here, and I want to tell you how much I look forward to seeing you over at JSW. Please redirect your bookmarks to Japan Security Watch and subscribe to the RSS feed there.

@defendingjapan will also change, becoming @JapanSecWatch, so current followers will continue to receive site updates. You can also follow me personally at @jamesinjapan.

Thanks everyone!

Chinese Espionage Cases Uncovered in the US in 2010

Last week STRATFOR posted an in-depth analysis of Chinese espionage in the US during 2010. The post comes as French car manufacturer Renault (alongside the national counter-intelligence agency, DCRI) investigate leaks to an unnamed foreign state after restricted information on the company’s electric vehicle development made its way into the hands of ‘persons unknown’.

The most telling part of the lengthy report was the huge table summarising the cases, which I present to you below (click for the full-size image):

Chinese Espionage Cases Uncovered in the US in 2010 (Source: STRATFOR.)

Chinese Espionage and French Trade Secrets is republished with permission of STRATFOR.

North Korean defectors and the ROK Army

North Korean defectors hold protest in Seoul on November 29, 2010 (Source: Chung Sung-Jun/Getty Images)

Public Radio International’s The World carried an interesting report by Jason Struther this week on the desire of some North Korean refugees to fight liberate their former state.

South Korea is understandably reluctant (but unwilling to talk about why):

Andrei Lankov, a North Korea analyst at Seoul’s Kookmin University, said in the past both Koreas trained defectors to infiltrate enemy lines. But times have changed, he said, and there are at least two good reasons these North Korean defectors should not be armed.

“One is that a creation of such a group, especially if it’s publicized to some extent, will be seen to the North Koreans as a provocation, and indeed this is a provocation, ” he said. “Second, if you arm these people, most of whom are ideologically motivated and probably quite selfless people who have nothing to lose, and who are determined to fight for their cause, well, you will create a loose cannon.”

Lankov added that the Ministry of Defense is probably also concerned that these defectors could be spies.

In the event of a war, former North Korean soldiers could work as pathfinders and guides, and it is hard to believe that Seoul has not considered this eventuality. However, as Lankov states above, the creation of the unit would be a provocation – such a unit could only be created with the intention of toppling the Kim regime. There would be no disguising it. In addition, going public on such a move would open the door to agents posing as refugees in the future (if not some of those already in the South). Thus, for the sake of the cease-fire and their security, South Korea couldn’t even admit such a unit even if it existed.

China Military Watch: Week 1

As this blog enters its fourth week, one theme that has consistently cropped up in the news is the issue of Chinese military developments. This post marks the first in an ongoing series tracking media and blogger reactions to the growth of China’s military capabilities.

Fear China: Danger Before the Doom? By J. Robert Smith @ American Thinker China, facing an end to its economic miracle, and facing a demographic crisis in a mere twenty years, may find its beefed up military useful in securing resources sooner through intimidation or, in some cases, through outright seizure — particularly in Asia, where China’s military would have its strongest reach.   China’s Military Comes Into Its Own By Rodger Baker @ STRATFOR A Chinese military motivated by nationalism — and perhaps an even stronger interest in preserving its power and influence within China — would find it better to be in contention with the United States than in calm. This is because U.S. pressure, whether real or rhetorical, drives China’s defense development.   China’s Questionable Military Aims By Robert Maginnis @ Human Events After two decades of military modernization it appears the PLA is pushing a hard-line agenda and becoming more willing to voice its opinion on foreign policy issues. This is a worrisome development especially as the Chinese leadership, which includes new nationalistic-minded military commanders, takes command in 2012.

Hope? China’s Military Muscle By Michael Swaine @ Carnegie Endowment for International Peace There is a serious danger that the U.S. image of a more assertive and aggressive China and the Chinese notion that the United States is on the decline will feed a sense of strategic rivalry—and this could become a self-fulfilling prophecy. To assume that there will be a growing military rivalry that will eventually evolve into a Cold War-type situation is the biggest risk for the United States and China.   J-20: The Threat We Think it Is? By DefenseTech China’s ability to rapidly develop this technology shows that the U.S. can’t ignore high-end threats and must keep its R&D shops humming. If the J-20 isn’t designed to defeat the F-22 and F-35, it’s follow-on will be.   U.S. Navy Chief Isn’t Sweating China’s Sea Power By Spencer Ackerman @ Danger Room Global maritime cooperation? “I would very much like the PLAN to be part of that and in fact they are.” New Chinese subs and satellites? “As we all seek to do… they clearly want to assure that operational space around the mainland and the areas they consider to be vital and important.” Growing Chinese sea power in general? “[C]onsistent historically with the economic rise of powers.” If there’s a message there, it’s that the U.S. Navy isn’t looking for a confrontation.

 

What it means for Japan

China’s Rise = Remilitarizing Japan? By John Hemmings @ The Diplomat Further Chinese militarisation will be met with further Japanese militarisation—and thus begins a dangerous cycle. By focusing on Japan’s past rather than a mutually beneficial future, and by embracing the worst elements of nationalism, Chinese leaders have sought to displace questions over legitimacy and internal political reform.

Japan PM ‘concerned’ over China’s defence build-up By AFP “We can’t help but have concerns about a certain lack of transparency in (China’s) defence build-up and growing maritime activities” … “Conflicts over maritime interests have been surfacing recently and we cannot ignore that they are becoming elements of regional instability,” Kan said. “We should claim Japan’s own rights openly and squarely.”

 

Media

China’s J-20 stealth fighter (left) alongside Russia’s Sukhoi PAK FA (centre) and the American F-22 Raptor (right) (source: DefenseTech)

Robert Kaplan on China’s Navy (source: Coming Anarchy)

South Korean missile limits

Under the 1979 US-ROK Accord, updated in 2001, South Korea is restricted from developing missiles with “a range of up to 300 kilometers and a payload of up to 500 kilograms.” The map below illustrates this current range:

300-km range from South Korea’s borders (click for full-size)

South Korea, however, is unhappy with the current limits and would like to be able to “extend it beyond 1,000 kilometers,” according JoongAng Daily’s government source.

What would 1000 km include? Have a look:

1000-km range from South Korea’s borders

While GI Korea at ROK Drop suggests that the limits might be in place to prevent South Korea from legitimising the North’s missile programme through pursuing one of its own, it is hard to dismiss the notion that the US is unwilling to put Tokyo in range of South Korean missiles.

It also raises the question of just why South Korea requires missiles capable of hitting targets over 1000-km away. The projections above are deceptive in that they show range from South Korea’s borders.* It is most likely that South Korea just wants to able to strike anywhere in the North from bases anywhere in South Korea.

However, could it also be forward planning? Beijing would also be within Seoul’s sights, for whatever that’s worth. Regardless of South Korea’s intentions, just giving it a capability that might raise Chinese ire is reason enough for the US to want to keep a lid on those missiles.

 

Note on maps:
*The overlays showing the ranges as measured from South Korea’s approximate borders. This would mean that the furthest reaches of the range would require launchers to be placed near the border or DMZ making them extremely vulnerable. Thus, in reading the maps, it is necessary to subtract a South Korea-sized range in order to account for a more practical range.

Weekend Update: Jan 23 2001

#1: Obama Hears a Hu

Presidents Barack Obama and Hu Jintao at a joint press conference in Washington on January 19. (Source: Reuters)

Chinese President Hu Jintao was in the US this week for what was expected to be his ‘legacy’ visit. Unfortunately, it didn’t seem that any concrete political developments came out of the talks besides pledges for closer cooperation. As The Daily Beast summed up concisely, ‘Obama didn’t get the concessions he wanted from China’s Hu. But then, he didn’t have the cards he needed.’

For some, however, it was good enough:

The Obama administration accomplished exactly what it set out to do: stake out its positions on a wide range of issues in the U.S.-China relationship, appear strong on concerns such as human rights, bring a little forward momentum to the relationship, and get a few deliverables (on the trade and investment front) in the process.

If anything, Hu seemed to go into the talks hoping to settle US fears over China’s recent antagonism:

It is only normal, in any relationship, to have disagreement and friction, Hu said. But he added that a strategic and long-term perspective will ensure relations will not be affected or held back by any individual incident at any particular time.

Despite this blogger’s expectations to the contrary, Hu did not offer any progress on bilateral military talks. It seems ever more likely that that option is not Hu’s to offer.

One of the more important discussions between Hu and Obama manifested into a joint statement on North Korea. In the statement, there was still some support for the Six-Party Talks (in whatever form they can finally settle on – it has been suggested that the inclusion of the talks in the statement was a compromise by Washington), as well as the specific mention of ‘the DPRK’s claimed uranium enrichment program,’ which could be read as China giving some ground on North Korea’s nuclear development – although China denies such a change. Whether any of what was said will amount to anything depends on inter-Korean talks, as well as North Korea more specifically.

The joint press conference with both leaders was plagued by interpretation issues which should cause the White House some embarrassment – or not, but Obama handled himself well, perhaps noticeably better than his Chinese counterpart. [Transcript here via CFR]

 

#2: Kan: “Japan-U.S. alliance is the foundation of Japan’s foreign policy”

Defense Minister Toshimi Kitazawa arrives at Kadena AFB, Okinawa on January 20 (Source: USAF)

At a speech for the Friendship Exchange Council, Prime Minister Kan reaffirmed the necessity of the US bases in Okinawa, and promised “to strengthen efforts through various opportunities to seek the understanding and cooperation of those living outside Okinawa regarding the burden of hosting U.S. bases.”

The speech came as Japan and US signed a new five-year Special Measures Agreement on ‘host nation support,’ often called the sympathy budget (omoiyari yosan). Foreign Minister Seiji Maehara wants to put a stop to this nickname:

“Host nation support is often referred to as ‘sympathy budget,’ but we will no longer use this term since host nation support is a strategic contribution by Japan,” he said. “I’d like to declare that it is something that is agreed based on mutual strategic grounds.”

Regardless of those mutual grounds, “Japan wanted to pay less because of its financial straits and the U.S. was hoping it would pay more in light of elevated tensions on the Korean Peninsula and China’s rising might.” It looks like Japan won out, but also allowed the US to insert a clause whereby Japan might “partially or completely compensate the United States for the cost of shifting U.S. military drills to other venues.” A hedge against developments in Okinawa?

Appropriately timed, Defense Minister Toshimi Kitazawa announced that Kadena AFB’s F-15 three-week training sessions would take place in Guam from April.

The Japan Times reported that:

Japan will cover the cost of relocating the F-15 drills under a bilateral pact to partially move them from U.S. Kadena Air Base in Okinawa, so about 20 F-15s can take part in each drill on Guam, with each lasting up to 20 days. Support aircraft, including aerial tankers, will also have to take part in the drills. The U.S. military can conduct the drills alone or jointly with the Self-Defense Forces.

Stars and Stripes added:

Kitazawa also told [Okinawa Gov. Hirokazu Nakaima] that both governments reached an agreement to close the 149-acre Marine Corps Gimbaru Training Area, located near Camp Hansen. Closure of the Marine training facility was first agreed to in 1996 by the Special Action Committee on Okinawa on the condition that the helicopter landing zone would be relocated to the nearby Kin Blue Beach Training Area and other Gimbaru facilities moved to Camp Hansen.

The announcements came as Kitazawa visited Okinawa (and Kadena AFB) – new Chief Cabinet Secretary and Minister for Okinawan Affairs Yukio Edano made a visit yesterday, and Maehara will follow before the end of the month. It shows a determined push by Kan to look strong on the problem of Okinawa, and it shows once more how Kan and his men have entered 2011 with fists swinging. His position is helped by an apparent softening on the issue following SecDef Robert Gates’ trip to East Asia last week:

“They’re looking for a compromise, to give Kan something that he can show to the public,” explains John Swenson-Wright, associate fellow of the Asia Programme at Chatham House. “It makes sense for Washington to offer practical concessions, but I’d be very surprised if the relocation of Futenma [within Okinawa] didn’t go through as originally agreed.”

Regardless of whether or not this is the result of America having thrown Japan a bone, Kan could certainly do with the support.

 

#3: South Korea and North Korea agree to high-level military talks

South Korean and North Korean guards at Panmunjom (Source: Debate It Out)

North Korea’s offer of talks has finally gained it some ground as South Korea agree to high-level military talks “only if the agenda included the two events that have soured relations – the sinking of a southern warship in March, and the shelling of a southern island.”

North Korea latest proposal for talks came on Thursday following the US-China Joint Statement on North Korea in Washington. The question remains whether North Korea will be happy to talk about those events and whether the answers it gives will be sufficient for the South.

With a cautiously optimistic wind in its sales, South Korea is also looking at having preliminary talks on denuclearisation:

“Our position is that separate high-level talks are essential to check sincerity about denuclearization and we will propose” such talks, Foreign Minister Kim Sung-hwan said at a New Year’s reception for foreign diplomats stationed in Seoul.

[...]

“If North Korea demonstrates sincerity through specific action and then six-party talks resume, our government will seek a comprehensive resolution of the North Korean nuclear issue” through its “grand bargain” idea of a one-time major deal of swapping denuclearization and concessions, he said.

“North Korea should decide on its own whether it will choose a dead-ended road of confrontation and enmity or a road of peace and prosperity,” he said

An editorial in the Chosun Ilbo guesses at the reason for North Korea’s willingness to come to the table:

Until now the North has told its starving people that normalized relations with the U.S. would solve the food shortage and economic problems. But the only country in the world with the ability and willingness to help North Korea is the South. This reality seems finally to have hit the North when Seoul halted all trade and exchanges following the sinking of the Cheonan. The only way for the North to reach out to Washington is through Seoul, and only through Washington can the doors to the wider world open.

One writer, Nuno Santiago de Magalhaes, was willing to connect the Yeonpyeong Island strike to the talks as part of a connected strategy to get Seoul to the table. It certainly describes North Korea’s past behaviour quite well, but it’s hard to say whether the Yeonpyeong attack was so well devised.

North Korea has to play its cards right as South Korea is unwilling to taken for a ride. That might be asking too much of the North.

 

The Small Print

Taiwan’s disappointing missile test = US arms opportunity?

Abductee Yaeko Taguchi spotted in North Korea last year?

Parents of abductee Keiko Arimoto fail to secure MOFA official interview tape in damages trail

Wikileaks on Japanese-US-Australian intelligence cooperation

Prime Minister Shinzo Abe with President George W. Bush and Prime Minister John Howard in Sydney, September 8 2007 (Source: MOFA)

This one was a bit of a surprise earlier in the week, but it offers useful insight into what Japan’s poor data OPSEC has done to its reputation.

In 2006, as Japan and Australia were discussing what would become the March 2007 Japan-Australia Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation, Australia and the US discussed Japanese proposals of a greater intelligence exchange relationship on regional issues, including rising China, North Korea, and Iran.

This particular passage was deeply telling:

In a meeting with senior Japanese Foreign Ministry intelligence officials, [Randall Fort, head of the US State Department Intelligence and Research Bureau] urged his counterparts to tap the ”underutilised assets” represented by the global network of Japanese businesses.

”Japan, with its economic and diplomatic presence in countries like Iran, could draw on insights that would be of great interest to the United States,”

Japan had a ”unique opportunity” to collect intelligence inside Iran where the US had no embassy, he argued.

”Any diplomatic or intelligence reporting Japan received from Iran, no matter how seemingly mundane, would be extremely valuable to us.”

However, Japan’s poor control over its information security left the US and Australia cold (this was a time when the MSDF were losing data to Chinese honeytraps and computer file-sharers). Indeed, Japan’s lax security are often blamed for Chinese military developments by security otaku in Japan.

It is unclear to what extent this intelligence exchange grew and how well it survived Prime Minister Shinzo Abe (assuming it was his initiative – he showed interest in bilateral security exchanges and the beefing up of Japanese intelligence).